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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred by Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)(j) and § 78-
2a-3(2)(j) (1953, as amended). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is essentially an action on an indemnity contract for the provision of title insur-
ance. In addition to the contract claims, plaintiffs complaint included claims for relief 
sounding in tort. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment in its favor which, over the objec-
tions of defendants, the trial court granted. This grant of summary judgment is being 
appealed here. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in failing to limit plaintiffs claims and defendants' duties 
to the provisions of the indemnity contract? 
2. Did the trial court err in finding Guardian Title liable for breach of contract 
where it had no express or implied duties under the contract? 
3. Did the trial court err in finding liability and breach of contract where defen-
dants performed their duties under the contract and plaintiff alleged no specific breach of 
contractual provisions? 
4. Did the trial court err in its determination of the measure of damages? 
5. Did the trial court err in failing to resolve defendants' claims that plaintiff had 
the opportunity to mitigate its damages and did not do so? 
6. Are there disputed, material facts which should have precluded the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment on all or part of the issues before it? 
The standard of review for issues determined by summary judgment is set forth in 
English v. Kienke. 774 P2d 1154 (Utah App 1989): 
Our analytical standard for review of a summary judgment is 
the same as that of the trial court: we review the facts and 
inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the 
losing party. If we conclude that a genuine issue of material 
fact exists, the summary judgment will be overturned and the 
case remanded for further proceedings on that issue. Where no 
material facts remain unresolved, we examine the trial court's 
conclusions of law and review them for correctness. 
English v. Kienke at 1156, citations omitted. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Rule 56(c). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time 
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of 
hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, an-
swers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocu-
tory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages. 
Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P., emphasis added. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff is the named insured on a title insurance policy issued by defendants. At 
the time the policy was issued, a trust deed in favor of Scenic Rail Credit Union, which 
was recorded subsequent to defendants' title search and issuance of a commitment for title 
insurance, held first priority position on the property which was security for plaintiffs loan, 
effectively depriving plaintiff of its insured first priority position. 
o 
Approximately two years after issuance of the policy, plaintiffs borrowers defaulted 
on their loan and subsequently filed bankruptcy. They also defaulted on the loan to Scenic 
Rail, secured by the first priority trust deed. Scenic rail foreclosed its trust deed by trus-
tee's sale nearly three years after the policy was issued, foreclosing the interest of plaintiff. 
As a result of loss of its security, plaintiff brought an action against defendants, 
alleging a variety of contract and tort claims. After conducting discovery, plaintiff moved 
for summary judgment in its favor on the issues of liability and damages. Over the objec-
tions of defendants that the action was one in contract and that damages were not properly 
measured, the trial court granted summary judgment. It is from this grant of summary 
judgment that defendants appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. M. Lynn Strong and Cherie G. Strong were owners of a single family residence 
located at 7629 South 835 East, Midvale, Utah. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (hereafter "Plaintiffs 
Memorandum"), page 1, paragraph 1. [Record, page 000375]). 
2. Prior to December 14, 1983, the Strongs approached United Savings and Loan 
Association for a loan. (Defendant Guardian Title Company's Memorandum in Opposition 
to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (hereafter "Guardian's Memorandum"), page 
2, paragraph 3. [Record, page 000514]). 
3. On December 14, 1983, Guardian Title Company issued a commitment for title 
insurance to United Savings as proposed insured. (Guardian's Memorandum, page 2, 
paragraph 3. [Record, page 000514]). 
4. On December 30, 1983, the Strongs obtained a loan in the amount of $31,300.00 
from Scenic Rail Credit Union, securing the loan with a trust deed on the property. The 
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trust deed was recorded February 14, 1984. (Plaintiffs Memorandum, page 2, paragraph 
2. [Record, page 000376]). 
5. Guardian Title, as agent for U.S. Life (Plaintiffs Memorandum, p. 2-4, paragra-
phs 4-7. [Record, p. 000376-000378]), acted as closing agent for the loan transaction bet-
ween Strongs and plaintiff, American Savings and Loan Association, closing the transaction 
on March 14, 1984. (Plaintiffs Memorandum, page 4, paragraph 6. [Record, page 000378-
]). Plaintiff did not order a new commitment for title insurance nor an updated title search 
prior to closing (Guardian's Memorandum, page 2, paragraph 3. [Record, page 000514]), 
and Guardian Title was not aware of the existence of the Scenic Rail trust deed until after 
the closing. (Guardian's Memorandum, p. 3-4, paragraph 8. [Record, p. 000515-000516]; 
Deposition of Fay Anderson, pages 49-51.) 
6. On or about March 23, 1984, Guardian Title, as agent for U.S. Life Title Insura-
nce Company, issued a Mortgagee Policy of Title Insurance, naming American Savings and 
Loan Association as insured, insuring against loss if the Deed of Trust is not in first prior-
ity position up to the maximum amount of $81,400.00. (Plaintiffs Memorandum, page 4, 
paragraph 6. [Record, page 000378]). 
7. Neither Guardian Title or US Life notified plaintiff of the title discrepancy. 
(Plaintiffs Memorandum, page 7, paragraph 12. [Record, page 000381]). 
8. For approximately two years, Strongs made regular payments on their obligations 
to plaintiff and to Scenic Rail. On February 1, 1986, Strongs defaulted on their loan with 
plaintiff. (Plaintiffs Memorandum, page 8, paragraph 14. [Record, page 000382]). 
9. Shortly after Strongs' default, plaintiff commenced foreclosure and for this pur-
pose obtained a title report which listed Scenic Rail Credit Union in first position and 
plaintiff in second position. Plaintiff failed to properly evaluate the foreclosure report to 
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determine its actual priority. (Plaintiffs Memorandum, page 8, paragraph 16. [Record, 
page 000382]). 
10. On August 8, 1986, Strongs filed a chapter 7 petition in bankruptcy. (Plaintiffs 
Memorandum, page 8, paragraph 15. [Record, page 000382]). 
11. Strongs also defaulted on their loan with Scenic Rail. Scenic Rail obtained 
relief from the bankruptcy stay and foreclosed its trust deed by trustee's sale on February 
23, 1987 and sold the property to a third party bidder for less than $28,000. (Plaintiffs 
Memorandum, page 9, paragraph 17. [Record, page 000383]; Guardian's Memorandum, 
page 7, paragraph 17. [Record, page 000519]). 
12. Plaintiff received copies of Scenic Rail's Notice of Default and Notice of Sale 
and again failed to verify its priority as to the property. (Plaintiffs Memorandum, page 9, 
paragraph 18. [Record, page 000383]). 
13. Defendants tendered to plaintiff the amount of $29,957.30 representing princi-
pal due on the Scenic Rail note plus interest. (John T. Anderson letter, March 17, 1988, 
enclosed in Addendum [Record, page 000561]). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs claims for relief sound primarily in tort. However, the facts and circums-
tances related to plaintiffs claims are all related to defendants' provision of a mortgagee's 
title insurance policy. Claims for malpractice, negligence, or other tort theories are, as a 
matter of law, precluded where the duties of the parties are express in or implied by con-
tract. 
Where the indemnity contract sets forth the duties, rights and liabilities of the 
parties, the court must give effect to the contractual provisions. In the title insurance 
policy which is the subject of this action, defendants' liability is expressly limited to the 
provisions of the policy and to the amounts prescribed as payment for losses. Further, no 
breach of the policy's provisions has occurred. 
Where the insured's title was not in first position when the title policy was issued, 
no breach occurred. The insurer merely became liable for indemnifying the insured ac-
cording to the provisions of the policy. Defendants did, in fact, tender the amount neces-
sary to remove the offending prior encumbrance. Therefore, no breach of the indemnity 
contract occurred. 
The trial court's award of summary judgment based upon tort and in excess of the 
provisions of the policy was in error. 
It was contemplated by the parties and the clear language of the title insurance 
policy that the insurer, U.S. Life Title, would perform the obligations under the policy. No 
performance was expected from Guardian Title which did not, upon issuance of the policy, 
merge into the indemnity contract. The trial court, therefore, erred in finding Guardian 
Title liable in breach to plaintiffs. 
The trial court also made an error of law in measuring damages. Though the liabil-
ity of defendants arose at the time the policy was issued, the damages arose only when they 
were actually incurred by plaintiff. Based upon the limitation of loss payment imposed by 
the policy and proper interpretation of the law of damages, plaintiff is entitled only to the 
difference between the value of its security had it been in first position and the value of 
the security as a result of the prior encumbrance. Because defendants did not guarantee 
the value of the security nor that the mortgage would be paid, plaintiff is not entitled to 
compensation from defendants for the reduced market value of the security nor the loss of 
payments on the mortgage. This amount of damages must be reduced to the extent that 
plaintiffs failure to respond to foreclosure sale of the prior encumbrance contributed to 
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the damages. 
In addition to the erroneous application of law, there existed material questions of 
fact which precluded the award of summary judgment. 
Because the court improperly awarded summary judgment and erroneously applied 
the law related to liability and damages, the summary judgment should be reversed and 
this matter remanded for trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FOUND DEFENDANTS 
LIABLE FOR CLAIMS SOUNDING IN TORT WHERE 
LIABILITY, IF ANY, IS CONTRACTUAL AND LIMITED TO 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE TITLE INSURANCE POLICY. 
The claims for relief contained in plaintiffs complaint sound primarily in tort. 
However, the facts and circumstances related to plaintiffs claims are all related to defen-
dants' commitment for title insurance and provision of a mortgagee's title insurance policy. 
A title insurance policy, and the commitment for title insurance which merges into it, 
constitute a contract between insurer and insured and "the rights of the parties are as 
provided for therein. The parties having agreed upon their own terms and conditions, 'the 
courts cannot change them and must not permit them to be violated or disregarded.'" 
Diversified Mortgage Investors v. U.S. Life Title Insurance Company. 544 F2d 571, 575 
(2nd Cir 1976), citations omitted. 
Claims for negligence, malpractice or other torts are inappropriate where the duties 
are established by the title insurance policy and plaintiffs injuries are a result of breach of 
those duties. The Idaho Supreme Court has recently addressed this issue, noting that: 
Theories of malpractice sounding in negligence may be neces-
sary where there is no contractual duty or contractual standard 
existent upon which to measure performance. Here, however, 
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the duty or standard of performance is set forth by contract-
the foreclosure reports and title insurance commitments--and 
measurement of performance can be fully accomplished by 
reference to the contracts. Any malpractice becomes a form of 
breach, rather than a separate claim for relief or cause of ac-
tion. 
Brown's Tie & Lumber v. Chicago Title Company. 764 P2d 423, 427 (Idaho 1988), empha-
sis added, citing trial court's "well-reasoned memorandum decision." Where the title insur-
ance policy contains a provision restricting actions or proceedings to the provisions of the 
policy, a "complaint which alleges a cause of action sounding in negligence as well as 
breach of contract, is inadequate as a matter of law." Chu v. Chicago Title Insurance 
Company. 452 NYS2d 229 (NY App Div 1982), emphasis added. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the relationship between insured and insurer 
is one which is contractual and does not give rise to tort claims. 
We therefore hold that in a first-party relationship between an 
insurer and its insured, the duties and obligations of the parties 
are contractual rather than fiduciary. Without more, a breach 
of those implied or express duties can give rise only to a cause 
of action in contract, not one in tort. 
Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985), emphasis added. 
More specifically related to title insurance, the Utah Court of Appeals has recently 
stated that: 
Title insurance is intended to indemnify an insured for losses 
suffered "by reason of defects in the title to the property or by 
reason of liens or encumbrances on the property itself." As 
with insurance policies in general, "The parties are free to 
define the exact scope of the policy's coverage and may specify 
the losses or encumbrances the policy is intended to encom-
pass." 
Valley Bank and Trust Company v. U.S. Life Title Insurance Company. 776 P2d 933, 935-
56 (Utah App 1989), citations omitted. 
In essence, defendants' duties are implied by or expressed in the title insurance 
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policy. Plaintiffs rights are defined by the indemnity contract and its causes of action are 
merged into the contractual provisions of the policy. Any liability of defendants must be 
based upon provisions of the policy. 
Among the express conditions and stipulations contained in the Mortgagee Policy of 
Title Insurance issued by defendants to plaintiff is the following language: 
11. Liability Limited to this Policy 
This instrument together with all endorsements and other 
instruments, if any, attached hereto by the Company is the 
entire policy and contract between the insured and the 
Company. 
Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negli-
gence, and which arises out of the status of the lien of the 
insured mortgage or of the title to the estate or interest cov-
ered hereby or any action asserting such claim shall be restrict-
ed to the provisions and conditions and stipulations of this 
policy. 
Mortgagee Policy of Title Insurance, USLIFE Title Insurance Company of Dallas, No. 
55397, issued March 16, 1984 @ 11:15 a.m., emphasis added. 
As a matter of law, plaintiffs claims against defendants are contractual, not based 
in tort Further, plaintiffs damages are limited by contract to the provisions set forth in 
the insurance policy. 
The trial court, therefore, clearly erred in granting summary judgment to plaintiff on 
the basis of its tort claims. Summary judgment on the question of liability should, there-
fore, be reversed and the issue remanded for trial. 
POINT II 
THE DUTIES OF DEFENDANT GUARDIAN TITLE WERE 
MERGED INTO THE TITLE INSURANCE POLICY UNDER 
WHICH DEFENDANT U.S. LIFE TITLE AGREED TO PER-
FORM THOSE DUTIES. THE TRIAL COURT, THERE-
FORE, ERRED IN FINDING GUARDIAN TITLE LIABLE 
TO PLAINTIFFS. 
o 
Guardian Title acted as agent for its disclosed principal, U.S. Life Title, in under-
writing and issuing a title insurance commitment, in closing the loan transaction for plain-
tiff and in issuing the title insurance policy insuring plaintiffs trust deed. All of the duties 
undertaken by Guardian Title in connection with the transaction were typical of a title 
insurance agent and Guardian did not represent nor purport to act as anything other than 
a title insurance agent for and on behalf of U.S. Life Title (see Statement of Facts and 
Brown's Tie & Lumber v. Chicago Title Company, cited infra). 
As discussed in Point I above, the rights of plaintiff and duties of defendants merged 
into the indemnity contract of title insurance. Likewise, the clear language of the title 
policy expresses the intention that the insurer, not Guardian as its agent, will perform the 
obligations set forth under the policy. Guardian was not expected to perform after the 
issuance of the title policy. This is typical in the title insurance industry and was clearly 
expected by both insurer and insured. 
It is well settled that where there is a disclosed principal/agent relationship, and the 
contract relates to a matter within the reasonable scope of the of agency, the agent will not 
be personally bound. 3 Am. Jur. 2d, §302, which provides in pertinent part: 
An agent is not liable for lawful acts done within the scope of his authority 
for and on behalf of a disclosed principal. The liability, if any, is that of the 
principal. If a contract is made with a known agent acting within the scope 
of his authority for a disclosed principal, the contract is that of the principal 
alone and the agent cannot be held liable thereon, unless credit has been 
given expressly and exclusively to the agent and it appears that it was clearly 
his intention to assume the obligation as a personal liability and that he has 
been informed that credit has been extended to him alone. [Numerous citat-
ions omitted, including Restatement, Agency 2d §320]. Id, p. 806. 
An insurance agent does, however, have a duty to procure the insurance policy on 
the terms and conditions directed by the client, and if he fails to do so, he would become 
liable for damages suffered from lack of insurance. 43 Am. Jur. 2d, §174. Once the 
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insurance agent has performed such duty and issued such contract, it has properly discharg-
ed its obligation and is not liable on the contract of insurance, nor does the agent become 
a guarantor of the financial condition or solvency of the insurance company. 3 Couch on 
Insurance 2d §25:48 (rev. 1984). 
Guardian performed its duties by issuing the insurance policy as instructed by 
plaintiff, and at no time since that date has the insurer, U.S. Life Title, disavowed the 
general enforceability of such contract or claimed that Guardian lacked authority to issue 
the policy upon the terms committed. Since the contract is one of indemnity, at the time 
the insured incurs a loss which is payable under the policy, it notifies the insurer, who is 
then expected to perform its indemnity. Neither the parties nor the policy expect nor 
contemplate that the agent will perform the insurer's duties as defined in the contract. 
Because Guardian had no duty which was not merged into the contract and because 
all parties expected U.S. Life to perform the duties set forth in the contract, Guardian 
could not be liable for any performance under the contract nor for a breach of the con-
tract. The trial court, therefore, erred in finding Guardian Title liable to plaintiff. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF RECEIVED THE PERFORMANCE FOR WHICH 
IT BARGAINED AND NO BREACH OF THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE INDEMNITY CONTRACT (TITLE INSURANCE 
POLICY) OCCURRED. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Brown's Tie noted the nature of title insurance as 
insurance against defects, not insurance of value or guarantee against prior encumbrances: 
The insurer has agreed to compensate for actual loss incurred 
in clearing or removing unexcepted encumbrances... Such has 
been explained in Appleman's respected treatise on insurance 
law: 
The purpose of title insurance is to protect a 
transferee of real estate from the possibility of a 
1 1 
loss through defects that may cloud the title. . . 
It has aptly been pointed out that a title insur-
ance policy does not insure the value of any par-
ticular property, or even the property at all, but 
rather insures the title against defects that may 
damage the insured's interest in the property. 
Nevertheless, while a title insurer assumes the risk 
of losses due to a defective title . . . a policy of 
title insurance does not represent that the contin-
gency insured against will not occur. 
Brown's Tie at 4291, emphasis added. 
The title insurance policy does not guarantee the status of the title. It merely agr-
ees to indemnify the insured if the status of the title is not as insured. As noted in Point 
I, delivery of the policy with a prior, unexcepted encumbrance imposes upon the insured 
the responsibility for indemnification under the terms of the policy. However, at that time, 
no breach of the contract has occurred. Defendants did not guarantee that plaintiff would 
be in first position, i.e., that there would be no prior encumbrances. The existence of the 
encumbrance, therefore, does not give rise to a breach of the title insurance contract. A 
breach can occur only when (1) the insured has incurred damage and (2) the insurer refus-
es or fails to perform its contractual duty to indemnify the insured. 
Defendants tendered to plaintiff the sum necessary to satisfy the amount due to 
Scenic Rail and to remove the prior encumbrance. This is the amount which ordinarily 
measures loss in these circumstances. Securities Service. Inc. v. Transamerica Title Insur-
ance Co.. 583 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Wash App 1978).2 Defendants performed their contractual 
obligations under the title policy. Plaintiff has neither alleged nor provided evidence of 
Citing 9 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 5201, pp. 8-9 (1981). 
2Citing National Holding Co. v. Tale Ins. <k Trust Co., 45 CaLApp 2d 215, 113 P.2d 906 (1941); Atlanta 
Tale & Trust Co. v. Inman, 42 Ga.App. 191, 155 S.E. 364 (1930); Broadway Realty Co. v. Lawyers9 rale Ins. & 
Trust Co., 226 N.Y. 335, 123 N.E. 754 (1919); 60 A.L.R.2d 969, 972 (1958). 
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any breach by defendants of other contractual duties. 
Because defendants have not breached their duties under the indemnity contract of 
title insurance, no further liability exists. The trial court clearly failed to address the ques-
tion of breach of contract as a matter of law. Its grant of summary judgment on the issue 
of liability is, therefore, improper and should be reversed. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION 
OF THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES. 
The trial court's statement of plaintiffs damages is correct, but it's application of the 
standard was improper. The trial court stated, "The Court is further of the opinion that 
American is entitled to the damages for which it bargained in its policy of Title Insurance 
to wit the loss it actually suffered." Minute Entry, April 19, 1989. The trial court based its 
decision upon Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association v. St. Paul Insurance 
Companies. 20 Utah 2d 95, 433 P2d 602 (1975), which cited from 9 Appleman's Insurance 
Law and Practice, par. 5210, page 15: 
Where at the time a policy was delivered the title was defective 
by reason of a lien or encumbrance, the contract was breached 
and the company was immediately liable to the insured for the 
loss actually suffered. 
Upon defendants' objection to the measure of damages, the trial court issued a second 
minute entry overruling the objections. The court stated, 
The Court is of the opinion that the measure of damages was fixed upon the 
breach of the contract by the insurer which occurred at the moment when 
the transaction was closed and the money lent without placing the lender . . 
. in a first mortgage position. 
Minute Entry, May 19, 1989. 
The trial court clearly failed to distinguish between the point at which liability arises 
and the point at which damage occurs. There is a clear distinction between "injury" which 
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gives rise to liability and "damage" which is the basis for compensation. 
The terms "injury" and "damage" are not synonymous-in fact, 
they are, in law, materially different. Appellee fails to take this 
distinction into account. 1 CJ.S. Actions § 15a, page 1005, 
contains a clear explanation of the difference between the two 
terms, as follows: 
The term "injury is sometimes used in the sense 
of "damage," as including the harm or loss for 
which compensation is sought, and has been de-
fined as damage resulting from an unlawful act; 
but in strict legal significance, there is, properly 
speaking, a material distinction between the two 
terms, in that injury means something done a-
gainst the right of the party, producing damage, 
whereas damage is the harm, detriment, or loss 
sustained by reason of the injury. 
Clark v. Cassettv. 376 P2d 37, 39 (NM 1962). 
The fact that plaintiff was not actually in first priority position at the time the policy 
was issued does not mean that plaintiff suffered damage at that time. So long as the 
borrower continued to make payments, no damage to plaintiff existed. In fact, had the 
borrower continued to make payments on the prior lien until it was paid off and plaintiff 
then been placed in first position, no damage would have resulted. Further, had plaintiff 
been made aware of the prior encumbrance prior to the borrower's default, it would have 
incurred no damage at that time. "[T]he mere existence of a title defect or prior encum-
brance does not establish a loss for purposes of mortgage insurance. The secured creditor 
incurs a loss only if the security proves inadequate because of the defect or a prior encum-
brance." Blackhawk Production Credit Association v. Chicago Title Insurance Company. 
400 NW2d 287, 289 (Wis 1986), emphasis added. 
The proper interpretation of the trial court's citation from Appleman is that the 
injury occurred at the time the policy was delivered, giving rise to liability as provided for 
in the policy. No damage actually occurred, however, until plaintiff incurred a loss as 
result of the inadequacy of the security due to the prior encumbrance. The damage did 
not occur until a substantial time after the issuance of the policy. 
What the plaintiff bargained for was the benefit, if any, of being in first priority 
position as to the security. Once the damage was incurred due to the prior lien, plaintiff 
was entitled to payment of loss as expressly provided for in the title policy: 
6. Determination and Payment of Loss 
(a) The liability of the Company under this policy shall in no 
case exceed the least of: 
(i) the actual loss of the insured claimant; or 
(ii) the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A, 
or, if applicable, the amount of insurance as defin-
ed in paragraph 2(a) hereof; or 
(iii) the amount of the indebtedness secured by the insured 
mortgage as determined under paragraph 8 hereof, at 
the time the loss or damage insured against hereunder 
occurs, together with interest thereon. 
Traditionally, contract damages are measured by the sum that will put the non-
breaching party in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been 
performed. Alexander v. Brown. 646 P2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982); Dobbs, Remedies. § 12.1, 
page 786. "The general rule in contract law is that the damages recoverable for a breach 
are those which arise naturally from the breach and which reasonably may be supposed to 
have been within the contemplation of the parties or are reasonably foreseeable." Robbins 
v. Finlay. 645 P2d 623, 625 (Utah 1982), emphasis added. 
In the case of title insurance, the parties bargained for payment of damages for 
damage to the insured resulting from any encumbrance or defect affecting the title priority 
guaranteed. That is, the insured is entitled to the benefits of being in first position and, if 
that benefit is lost due to a prior encumbrance, to be paid the difference between what he 
would have received had he been in first position and that which he received as a result of 
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the defect or encumbrance. As noted above, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated, "Title 
insurance is intended to indemnify an insured for losses suffered 'by reason of defects in 
the title to the property or by reason of liens or encumbrances on the property itself.'" 
[Citation omitted.] Valley Bank v. U.S. Life Title at 935. 
Even though a title policy may "guarantee" title, read in its entirety, it is actually 
only an indemnity contract which, despite the guarantee, "only contracts to pay the insured 
for damages upon failure of the guaranty. It is a contract of indemnity and not a 
guaranty." 
Stewart Title Guaranty Company v. Cheatham. 764 SW2d 315, 318 (Tex App 1988), Re-
hearings denied. "Recovery under a title insurance policy is limited to the actual amount 
of loss which is proven to be caused by the title defect, not to exceed the amount of the 
policy coverage." Id. at 319, emphasis added. A title policy entitles the insured to indem-
nity and payment "only to the extent that its security is impaired and to the extent of the 
resulting loss which it sustains.3 Because there are unresolved issues as to the value of the 
mortgaged property. . . determination of the extent of the insurer's obligation must await 
trial." Diversified Mortgage Investors v. U.S. Life Title Insurance Company. 544 F2d 571, 
574-75, n2 (2nd Cir 1976), emphasis added. 
In its first minute entry, the trial court cited Securities Service. Inc. v. Transamerica 
Title Insurance Company. 583 P2d 1217 (Wash App 1978) in support of its damage award 
measured by the money actually loaned by plaintiff. The trial court failed to note the 
distinction between the facts in Securities Service and those of the case before it, i.e., that 
the title insurance policy issued in Securities Service was an owner's or purchaser's policy 
while the policy issue in the present case is a mortgagee's policy. The Washington Court 
3Citing 45 CJ.S., Insurance § 969 at 1162 (1946); 13 Couch on Insurance 2d § 48:108 at 582 (1965); 
Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 872, 976 (1958), other citations omitted. 
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of Appeals held it was improper to impose a duty on the insurer beyond that contained in 
the title policy and noted that the insurer did not insure clear title or that no losses would 
be sustained by the insured. 
Any discussion of the issues raised by the parties must begin 
with an examination of the title policy itself. Nowhere in the 
policy is there any mention of an obligation or duty of Trans-
america to "clear title" for the insured. . . Title policies of the 
kind issued by Transamerica in this case do not guarantee or 
insure a clear title or that there will be no losses. 
* * * * * 
In view of the plain language of the policy it was improper for 
the trial court to rewrite the insurance contract so as to impose 
a broader duty. . . 
Securities Service 1220-21, emphasis added. 
In Securities Service, the Court of Appeals determined the owner's damage to be 
the amount paid for the property plus interest. To hold the same measure of damages for 
a mortgagee, however, would amount to imposing upon the mortgagee a duty to insure the 
value of the loan, not the status of the title. 
Several courts have rejected the argument that loss due to a defect in the security 
makes the insurer liable for the balance due on the note. E.g., ". . .the payment of the 
note is not insured. The insurer underwrites only against loss due to a defect in the secur-
ity." Southwest Title Insurance Company v. Northland Building Corporation. 552 SW2d 
425, 430 (Tex 1977). The issue was also addressed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court: 
Title insurance has been described as a contract of indemnity. 
Its purpose is to indemnify the insured for impairment of its 
interest due to failure of title as guaranteed in the title insur-
ance report. 
* * * * * 
Defining and measuring actual loss under a title insurance 
policy is not the same for the owner who has title to property 
and a mortgagee who holds only a security interest in the bor-
rower's title. . . A mortgagee's loss cannot be measured unless 
the underlying debt is not repaid and the security for the mort-
gage is inadequate. For a mortgagee, title insurance undertakes 
to indemnify against loss or damage sustained by reason of 
defects of title or liens upon the land, but does not guarantee 
either that the mortgaged premises are worth the amount of the 
mortgage or that the mortgage debt will be paid. 
Blackhawk Production Credit Association v. Chicago Title Insurance Company. 423 NW2d 
521, 524-25 (Wis 1988), citations omitted, emphasis added. 
The title insurance policy issued by defendants did not guaranty the value of the 
premises nor payment of the mortgage debt. At the time of the foreclosure sale on the 
prior lien, the property securing the debt had decreased in value. The indemnity contract 
was not intended by the parties to cover this loss of value. The sole intent of the indem-
nification was to compensate the plaintiff for loss incurred because it was not in first 
priority as provided in the policy. 
Because the actual loss to plaintiff due to solely the prior encumbrance was less 
than the remaining mortgage amount, that lesser amount is the extent of defendants' 
liability as defined in the title policy. That amount of damages must be calculated as the 
difference between what plaintiff would have received had it been in first priority position 
and what it actually received due to the existence of the prior lien. Because defendants 
did not insure against a decrease in market value of the property, the damage calculation 
must take into consideration the market value of the security at the time the loss was 
incurred, not at the time the policy was issued. 
The trial court's award of the total amount of the mortgage obligation, reduced by 
payments made, is clearly in error as a matter of law. Therefore, summary judgment on 
the issue of damages should be reversed and the matter remanded for trial. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFF HAD AN OPPORTUNITY AND A DUTY TO 
MITIGATE ITS DAMAGES AND FAILED TO DO SO. THE 
1 Q 
AWARD OF DAMAGES, THEREFORE, SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN REDUCED OR ELIMINATED. 
A party may not ignore opportunities to avoid loss or minimize damages and, as a 
matter of law, must "exercise reasonable care and diligence" to do so. DeBry and Hilton 
Travel Services. Inc. v. Capitol International Airwavs. Inc.. 583 P2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1978). 
In a more recent summary of the law of damages, the Utah Supreme Court has summa-
rized the doctrine of mitigation of damages: 
It is a well-settled rule of the law of damages that "no party 
suffering a loss as the result of a breach of contract is entitled 
to any damages which could have been avoided if the aggrieved 
party had acted in a reasonably diligent manner in attempting 
to lessen his losses as a consequence of that breach." 3 
Williston on Sales § 24-5, at 405 (4th ed. 1974). This doctrine 
is the mitigation of damages rule "that a party has the active 
duty of making reasonable exertions to render the injury as 
light as possible . . . and that no recovery may be had for losses 
which the person injured might have prevented by reasonable 
efforts and expenditures." Fairfield Lease Corp. v. 717 Pharma-
cy, Inc., 109 Misc2d 1072, 1077, 441 NYS 2d 621, 624 (NY City 
Civ. Ct. 1981) (citations omitted). We have held: 
Where a contractual agreement has been 
breached by a party thereto, the aggrieved party 
is entitled to those damages that will put him in 
as good a position as he would have been had 
the other party performed pursuant to the agree-
ment. A corollary to this rule is that the ag-
grieved party may not, either by action or inac-
tion, aggravate the injury occasioned by the 
breach, but has a duty actively to mitigate his 
damages. Utah Farm Production Credit Associa-
tion v. Cox, 627 P2d 62, 64 (Utah 1981) (citations 
omitted). 
Madsen v. Murrey & Sons Co.. Inc.. 743 P2d 1212, 1214-15 (Utah 1987), emphasis added. 
Plaintiff obtained a foreclosure report shortly after February 1, 1986. (Plaintiffs 
Memorandum, page 8, paragraph 16.) Plaintiff also received notice (in December 1986 
and the first part of 1987) that its interest in the security was being foreclosed by Scenic 
Rail Credit Union as superior lienholder. (Plaintiffs Memorandum, page 9, paragraph 17; 
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Plaintiffs Memorandum, page 9, paragraph 18.) Plaintiff, for whatever reason, failed to 
respond to those notices and to take appropriate action, including notification of defen-
dants, to preserve its interest in the property. Defendants were willing and able to and, did 
in fact, tender to plaintiff payment for the full amount required to pay the prior lienholder 
and remove its interest of record. 
Some of the loss incurred by plaintiff was a direct result of its failure to act in 
protection of its interest in the security. To the extent that prompt, appropriate action by 
plaintiff could have reduced the damages claimed, the award of damages should have been 
reduced. 
The trial court failed to adequately address the issue of mitigation in its determina-
tion of damages. Further, the questions surrounding plaintiffs failure to mitigate are 
questions of fact. The summary judgment for damages should, therefore, be reversed and 
the issue remanded for trial. 
POINT VI 
THERE ARE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT WHICH 
PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
As discussed above, the issues of liability and damages contain several questions of 
fact which preclude summary judgment under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Among those questions of fact are: 
1. What, if any, of the actions of defendants are not included within the duties 
express or implied in the indemnity contract of title insurance? 
2. At exactly what point in time did plaintiff incur damages for which it is entitled 
to indemnity and compensation? 
3. What was the market value of the security at the time when damages arose? 
?n 
4. What was the difference between the value of plaintiffs security at the time 
damage arose and the value of that security had plaintiff been in first priority position? 
5. At what point was plaintiff aware that its priority was subordinate to a prior 
encumbrance? 
6. Did plaintiff fail to take prompt, appropriate action to protect its interest in the 
security, thereby mitigating its damages? 
7. To what extent did plaintiffs failure to mitigate affect the amount of damages? 
Any of these questions of fact is sufficient, under the provisions of Rule 56, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, to preclude summary judgment of this action. The trial court, 
therefore, erred in granting summary judgment. Summary judgment should be reversed 
and the issues remanded for factual determination. 
CONCLUSION 
There were unresolved questions of material fact which should have precluded the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
Further, the trial court's determinations as to liability based upon plaintiffs com-
plaint and damages to be awarded were both erroneous as a matter of law. Plaintiffs 
rights and defendants' duties are restricted, as a matter of law, to the provisions of the title 
insurance policy. As a result of the merger of those rights and duties into the indemnity 
contract, defendant Guardian Title had no duty to perform under the policy. Nor was 
there a breach of the duties established by the policy. 
Because there are unresolved fact questions and because the trial court made incor-
rect legal rulings, the trial court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed and the 
case remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted this ^iS"day of June, 1990. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Lester A. Perry 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Minute Entry, dated April 19, 1989. 
2. Minute Entry, dated May 19, 1989. 
3. Mortgagee Policy of Title Insurance. 
4. Letter from John Anderson to plaintiffs counsel, March 17, 1988. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, a California 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
USLIFE TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF DALLAS a/k/a TITLE 
USA INSURANCE CORPORATION, a 
Texas corporation, GUARDIAN 
TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH, a Utah 
corporation, WARREN H. 
CURLIS, CHARLOTTE LAFAY ANDERSON, 
and JOAN KILLPACK 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Civil No. 87-4811 
The Court having heard argument on plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Motion to Amend Complaint and defendant 
Title USA Insurance Corporation's Motion to Disqualify the 
Plaintiff's Counsel and having considered the various motions, 
memorandums and affidavits filed in support and in opposition 
thereto and being fully advised in the premises does now 
therefore make and enter this its: 
DECISION 
The Motion of American Savings and Loan Association for 
Summary Judgment is hereby granted. The Court is of the opinion 
that under ruling case law, American Savings and Loan 
Association is entitled to Judgment herein and the fact that it 
is alleged to have had notice of being second in priority does 
not change the liability of the insurer USLife. The Court is 
further of the opinion that American is entitled to the damages 
for which it bargained in its policy of Title Insurance to wit 
the loss it actually suffered. See 9 Appleman's Insurance Law 
And Practice par. 5210 where it is stated "Where at the time the 
policy was delivered the title was defective by reason of a lien 
or encumbrance, the contract was breached and the company was 
immediately liable to the insured for the loss actually 
suffered.11 See also: Security Service Inc. v. Trans America 
Title Insurance Co. Wash. App.,583 P.2d 1217. Therefore it 
would appear that the actual loss suffered less any amount 
heretofore paid would be the proper measure of damages, i.e. the 
underlying trust deed note in the principle sum of $81,400 
together with interest, applicable penalties, late fees and 
reserve shortages as set forth therein less any amounts paid on 
said obligation. It appears from the file that as of February 
1, 1986 the balance due on the note was $82,651.51 which 
included interest, late fees and a reserved shortage as of that 
date. In further support of the granting of Summary Judgment in 
favor of American in this matter see: Prudential Federal Savinqs 
and Loan Association v. St. Paul Insurance Companies v. First 
American Title Insurance and Trust Company, 20 Utah 2d 95; 433 
P.2d 603. The only issue remaining is the question of 
American's entitlement to attorney's fees. The Court finds that 
it is not entitled to attorney's fees on the basis that there is 
not sufficient showing of a bad faith defense in this matter 
that the Court, as a matter of law, can hold that the defendants 
are responsible or liable for the payment of American's 
attorneys fees. The basis for this decision is as set forth in 
the memorandum of counsel for the plaintiff in support of said 
motion and the Court finds specifically, inter alia, that there 
has been a breach of the contract of insurance by USLife Title 
making it and Guardian Title Company liable as a matter of law. 
This ruling makes moot all of the balance of the questions 
raised by the Motions to Disqualify and the Motion to Amend. 
Counsel for the plaintiff will prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this / / day of April, 1989. 
RECFV-PQ 
L. BENoC;-,- i:.:A3EY 
Date 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NEW WEST FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, as 
Assignee of the FEDERAL 
SAVINGS AND LOAN INSURANCE 
CORPORATION as Receiver for 
AMERICAN SAVINGS, A Federal 
Savings and Loan Association, 
As Assignee of the FEDERAL 
SAVINGS AND LOAN INSURANCE 
CORPORATION, as Receiver for 
Plaintiff AMERICAN SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
USLIFE TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF DALLAS a/k/a TITLE 
USA INSURANCE CORPORATION, 
a Texas Corporation, and 
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY 
OF UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Civil No. 87-4811 
The Court having considered the objections of the 
defendant to the Amended Summary Judgment and the Memorandum in 
opposition to the objections filed by the defendant and being 
fully advised in the premises does now therefore make and enter 
this its: 
DECISION 
The objections are denied. The Court is of the opinion 
that the measure of damages was fixed upon the breach of the 
contract by the insurer which occurred at the moment when the 
transaction was closed and the money lent without placing the 
lender , the plaintiff in this case, in a first mortgage 
position. The later value of the property measured by fair 
market value or other measures is not relevant as the damages 
occurred at the moment of the closing. Clearly the plaintiff 
lost the amount of money which it loaned and against which it 
was se.eking insurance by reason of its contract with the 
defendant USLife Title Insurance Company. For these reasons 
among others the said objection is denied. Counsel for the 
plaintiff shall furnish a Summary Judgment to the Court for 
signature. 
Dated this / / day of May, 1989. 
Ritti&Jfd 
Distr^t 
/ 
iffat 
Judge 
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EXHIBIT A 
Mortgagee Pblicy 
of Title 
Insurance 
POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE Issued by USL1FE Title Insurance Company of Dallas, 
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE. THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN 
SCHEDULE B AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS 
HEREOF, USLIFE Title Insurance Company of Dallas, a Texas corporation, herein called 
the Cnmpany_msures. a.^  nf Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage, 
rioi exceed in <f"t he amounFof insurance staTecTin Scnedule A, and costs, attorneys fees 
and expenses which the Company may-become obligated to pay hereunder, sustained or 
incurred by the insured by reason of: 
<-JT. Title to the estate or interest d ascribed in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as 
stated therein: 
L2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title; 
3. Lack of a right of access to and from the land; 
tA. Unmarketability of such title; 
u^rr The invalidity or unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage upon said estate 
or interest/except to the extent that such invalidity or unenforceability, or claim thereof, 
arises out of the transaction evidenced by the insured mortgage and is based upon 
a. usury, or 
b. any consumer credit protection or truth in lending law; 
6. The priority of any lien or encumbrance over the lien of the insured mortgage; 
7. Any statutory lien for labor or material which now has gained or hereafter may gain 
priority over the lien of the insured mortgage, except any such lien arising from an 
improvement on the land contracted for and commenced subsequent to Date of Policy 
not financed in whole or in part by proceeds of the indebtedness secured by the insured 
mortgage which at Date of Policy, the insured has advanced or is obligated to advance; or 
8. The invalidity or unenforceability of any assignment, shown in Schedule A of the 
insured mortgage or the failure of said assignment to vest title to the insured mortgage 
in the named insured assignee free and clear of all liens. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, USLIFE Title Insurance Company of Dallas has caused this 
policy to be signed and sealed by its duly authorized officers in facsimile to be valid, as 
of Date of Policy shown in Scnedule A, only when it bears an authorized, original 
countersignature. 
jU^M- ve&* 
President & Chief Executive Officer 
fa<«/AiiA*/06~/~ *£-*>* 
tffifl*-
Attest: Senior Vice-President. Secretary and General Counsel 
GUARDrAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH 
Act: thotizeo Countersignature 
l is 
xclusions F 
following matters are expressiv excluaea from the coverage 
his poiicv: 
. Any taw, ordinance or governmental regulation (including out 
not limited to Duiiding and zoning ordinances) restricting or 
regulating or prohibiting the occupancy, use or enjoyment of 
the iana. or regulating the character, dimensions or location 
of any improvement now or hereafter erected on the land, or 
prohibiting a seoaration in ownership or a reduction in the 
dimensions or area of the land, or the effect of any violation 
of any such law, ordinance or governmental regulation. 
I. Rights of eminent domain or governmental rights of police 
power uniess notice of the exercise of such rights appears in 
the public records at Date of Policy. 
3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other mat-
te7sn¥rcrHafe^7sLrffered, assumed or agreed to by thTTnslJrea 
Conditions 
Definition of Terms 
The following terms when used in this poiicy mean: 
(a) "insured": the insured named in Schedule A. The term "in-
red" also includes (i) the owner of the indebtedness secured by 
e insured mortgage and each successor in ownership of such 
jebtedness (reserving, however, all rights and defenses as to any 
ch successor who acquires the indebtedness by operation of law 
distinguished from purchase including, but not limited to, heirs, 
stributees, devisees, survivors, personal representatives, next of 
i or corporate or fiduciary successors that the Company would 
ve had against the successor's transferor), and further includes 
i any governmental agency or instrumentality which is an insurer 
guarantor under an insurance contract or guaranty insuring or 
laranteetng said indebtedness, or any part thereof, whether 
imed as an insured herein or not, and (iii) the parties designated 
paragraph 2 (a) of these Conditions and Stipulations. 
(b) "insured claimant": an insured claiming loss or damage 
jreunder. 
(c) "knowledge": actual knowledge, not constructive knowl-
ige or notice which may be imputed to an insured by reason of 
ly public records. 
(d) "land": the land described, specifically or by reference in 
chedule A, and imorovements affixed thereto which by law con-
f u t e reai property: provided, however, the term " land" does not 
iciude any property beyond the lines of the area specifically ae-
:ribed or referred to in Schedule A, nor any right, title, interest, 
state or easement in abutting streets, roads, avenues, alleys, lanes. 
rays or waterwavs, but nothing herein snail modify or iimit the extent 
) wnich a ngnt of access to and from the land is insured by this poiicy. 
(e) "mortgage": mortgage, deed of trust, trust deed, or other 
ecunty instrument. 
(f) "public records": those records which by law impart con-
ductive notice of matters relating to said land. 
I. (a) Continuation of Insurance after Acquisition 
of Title 
This Doiicy shall continue in force as of Date of Poiicy in favor of 
n insured who acquires all or any part of the estate or interest in 
he land described in Schedule A by foreclosure, trustee's sale, con-
eyance in iieu of foreclosure, or other legal manner which cis-
:harges the lien of the insured mortgage, and if the insured is a 
:orporation, its transferee of the estate or interest so acauired. 
)roviaed the transferee is the parent or wholly owned subsidiarv of 
he insured: and in favor of any governmental agency or instrumen-
aiity wnich acquires all or any part of the estate or interest 
pursuant to a contract of insurance or guarantv insuring or guaran-
eemg the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage: proviaed 
.hat the amount of insurance hereunder after such acquisition, 
exclusive of costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company 
nay oecome obligated to Day. snail not exceed the least of: 
(i) the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A; 
(ii) the amount of the unpaid pnnciDai of the indebtedness as 
defined in paragraph 8 hereof, pius interest thereon, expenses 
of foreclosure and amounts advanced to protect the iien of tne 
insurea mortgage ana secured DV said insured mortgage at 
Coverage 
claimant: \o) not known to the Companv and not shown by the 
public records out known to the insured claimant either at 
Date of Poiicv or at the date such claimant acquired an estate 
or interest insured by this poiicy or acquired the insured mort-
gage and not disclosed in writ ing by the insured claimant to 
the Comoanv prior to the date sucn insured claimant became 
an insured hereunder: (c) resulting m no loss or damage to the 
insured c.aimant: (d) attaching or created subsequent to Date 
of Policy .'except to the extent insurance is afforded herein as 
to any statutory lien for labor or material), 
4. Unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage because 
of failure of the insured at Date of Poiicy or of any subsequent 
owner of the indebtedness to comply with applicable "doing 
business" laws of the state in which the land is situated. 
and Stipulations 
taiity, if such agency or instrumentality is the insured claimant, 
in tho acquisition of such estate or interest in satisfaction of 
its insurance cont ractor ouarantv. 
(b) Continuation of Insurance after Conveyance 
of Title 
The coverage of this poiicy shail continue in force as of Date 
of Poiicy in favor of an insured so iong as such insured retains an 
estate or interest in the land, or hoids an indebtedness secured by 
a purchase money mortgage given by a purchaser from such in-
sured, or so iong as such insured shall have liability by reason of 
covenants of warranty made by such insured in any transfer or 
conveyance of such estate or interest; provided, however, this 
poiicy snail not continue in force in favor of any purchaser from 
such insured of either said estate or interest or the indebtedness 
secured by a purchase money mortgage given to such insured. 
3. Defense and Prosecution of Actions—Notice of 
Claim to be given by an Insured Claimant 
(a) The Company, at its own cost and without undue delay, snail 
provide for the defense of an insured in all litigation consisting of 
actions or proceedings commenced against such insured, or 
defenses, restraining orders or injunctions interposed against a 
foreclosure of the insured mortgage or a defense interposed against 
an insured in an act ion to enforce a cont rac t for a sale of 
the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage, or a sale of the 
estate or interest in said land, to the extent that such litigation is 
founded upon an alleged defect, lien, encumbrance, or other matter 
insured against by this policy. 
(b) The insured shall notify the Company promptly in writ ing 
(i) in case any action or proceeding is begun or defense or restrain-
ing order or injunction is interposed as set forth in (a) above, (ii) in 
case knowledge shaii come to an insured hereunder of any ciaim of 
title or interest which is adverse to the title to the estate or interest 
or the lien of the insured mortgage, as insured, and which might 
cause loss or damage for which the Company may be liable by virtue 
of this policy, or (iii) if title to the estate or interest or the iien of 
the insured mortgage, as insured, is rejected as unmarKetable. If 
such prompt notice shall not be given to tne Company, then as to 
such insured all liability of the Company snail cease and terminate 
in regard to the matter or matters for which sucn prompt notice is 
required: provided, however, that faiiure to notify shail in no case 
prejudice the rights of any such insured unoer this poiicy uniess the 
Company snail be prejudiced by such faiiure and then only to the 
extent of such prejudice. 
(c) The Company shall have the right at its own cost to institute and 
without undue delay prosecute any action or proceeding or to do anv 
other act which in its ODinion may be necessarv or desirable to establish 
the title to tne estate or interest or tne iien of the insured mortgage, as 
insured, and tne Comoanv may take any appropriate action under the 
terms of this poiicy, wnetner or not it snail be iiaoie thereunder, and shall 
not thereoy concede liability or waive any provision of this policy. 
(d) Whenever tne Comoanv shall have brougnt anv action or inter-
posed a defense as reouireo or permitted bv tne provions of this ooiicv, 
the Comoanv mav pursue anv such litigation to final determination bv a 
~?—• ~+ r^^nmflnt HiriQmrnnn ann <?xnressiv reserves the rignt, in its 
(Conditions an lulations continued ai 
(e) In ail cases wnere this concv cermu. recuires the Corn-
any to prosecute or orovice for the defense of anv action or 
roceeding, the insured hereunder snail secure to the Ccmcany 
ie ngnt to so prosecute or provide defense m such action or 
roceeoing, and ail aopeais therein, and permit the ComDany to 
se. at its ODtion. the name of such insured for such purDOse. 
/henever requested by the Company, sucn insured shall give the 
ompany ail reasonaoie aid in any such action or proceeding, in 
Meeting settlement, securing evidence, ootaming witnesses, or 
rosecutmg or defending sucn action or proceeding, and the Corn-
any shaii reimburse such insured for any expense so incurred. 
.. Notice of Loss—Limitation of Action 
In addition to the notices required under paragraDh 3(b) of these 
onditions and Stipulations, a statement in writ ing of any loss or 
amage for which it is claimed the Company is iiabie under this 
Dlicy shall be furnished to the Company within 90 days after such 
ss or damage snail have oeen determined and no ngnt of action 
lall accrue to an insured claimant until 30 davs after such state-
ent shall have been furnished. Failure to furnish such statement 
:
 loss or damage snail terminate any liability of the Company 
ider this policy as to such ioss or damage. 
Options to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims 
The Company snail have the option to pay or otherwise settle 
r or in the name of an insured claimant any claim insured against 
• to terminate ail liability and obligations of the Company here-
lder by paying or tendering payment of the amount of insurance 
ioer this policy together with any costs, attorneys' fees and ex-
jnses incurred UD to the time of such payment or tenoer of pay-
ent by the insured claimant and authorized by the Company. In 
ise loss or damage is claimed under this poiicy by an insured, the 
Dmpany shall have the further ootion to purcnase such indebted-
>ss for the amount owing thereon together with ail costs, 
torneys fees and expenses which the ComDany is obligated 
jreunoerto pay. if the ComDany offers to purchase said indebted-
JSS as herein provided, the owner of sucn indebtedness shall 
3nsfer and assign said indebtedness and the mortgage and any 
lilaterai securing the same to the Company upon payment there-
r as herein provided. 
. Determination and Payment of Loss 
(a) The iiabiiity of the Company under this poiicy shall in no 
ise exceed the !east of: 
(/) the actual loss of the insured claimant; or 
(ii) the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A, or, if applicable, 
the amount of insurance as defined in paragraph 2(a) hereof; or 
(iii) the amount of the indebtedness secured by the insured 
mortgage as determined under paragraph 8 hereof, at the 
time the loss or damage insured against hereunder occurs, 
together with interest thereon. 
(b) The Company wiil pay, in addition to anv Ioss insured against 
r
 this policy, all costs imDOseo upon an insured in litigation car-
id on by the ComDany for such insured, and ail costs, attorneys' 
3S and expenses in litigation carried on by such insured with the 
-itten authorization of the Company. 
(c) When liability has been definitely fixed in accordance with 
e conditions of this poiicy, the loss or damage shall be payable 
thin 30 days thereafter. 
. Limitation of Liability 
No ciaim shall arise or be maintainable under this poiicy (a) if 
a Company, after having received notice of an alleged defect, 
n or encumbrance insured against hereunder, by litigation or 
herwise, removes such defect, iien or encumbrance or estab-
nes the title, or the lien of the insured mortgage, as insured, 
thin a reasonaDie time after receipt of sucn notice; (b) in the 
ent of litigation until there has been a final determination by a 
urt of comDetent jurisdiction, and disposition of ail appeals 
Brerrom. adverse to the title or to the lien of the insured mort-
ge, as insured, as provided in paragraph 3 hereof; or ic) for 
Diiitv voluntarily assumed bv an insured in settling any claim or 
it without prior written consent of the Comoanv. 
R e d u c t i o n o f L i a b i l i t y 
concluded from reverse of policy face) 
:ne acauisition or titi said estate or interest as provided in 
paragraon 2(a) of these Conditions and StiDuiations. shall not re-
duce cro tanto the amount of the insurance afforced hereunder 
except to the extent that sucn payments reduce the amount of the 
indebtedness secured bv the insured mortgage. 
Payment in full by any person or voluntary satisfaction or release 
of the insured mortgage shall terminate ail liability of the Company 
except as provided in paragraph 2(a) hereof. 
(b) The iiabiiity of the ComDany shall not be increased by addi-
tional principal indebtedness created subsequent to Date of Policy, 
except as to amounts advanced to protect the iien of the insured 
mortgage and secured thereby. 
No payment shail be made without producing this poiicy for en-
dorsement of such payment unless the policy be lost or destroyed, 
in which case proof of ioss or destruction shail be furnished to the 
satisfaction of the Company. 
9. Liability Noncumuiat ive 
If the insured acquires title to the estate or interest in satisfac-
tion of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage, or any 
part thereof, it is exDressiy understood that the amount of insur-
ance under this poiicy shail be reduced by any amount the Com-
pany may pay under any policy insuring a mortgage hereafter 
executed by an insured which is a charge or iien on the estate or 
interest described or referred to in Schedule A, and the amount so 
paid shall be deemed a payment under this poiicy. 
10. Subrogation Upon Payment or Settlement 
Whenever the Company shail have settled a ciaim under this 
poiicy, ail right of subrogation shail vest in the Company unaf-
fected by any act of the insured claimant, except that the owner of 
the indebtedness secured bv the insured mortgage may reiease or 
substitute the personal Iiabiiity of any debtor or guarantor, or ex-
tend or otherwise modify the terms of payment, or reiease a por-
tion of the estate or interest from the lien of the insured mortgage, 
or release any collateral security for the indebtedness, provided 
such act occurs prior to receipt by the insured of notice of any 
ciaim of title or interest adverse to the title to the estate or interest 
or the priority of the lien of the insured mortgage and does not 
result in any loss of priority of the iien of the insured mortgage. 
The Comoany shall be subrogated to and be entitled to ail rights 
and remedies which such insured claimant would have had against 
any person or property in respect to such ciaim hao this policy not 
been issued, and if reouested by the Company, such insured 
claimant shail transfer to the Company ail rights and remedies 
against any person or property necessary in order to perfect such 
right of subrogation and shail permit the Company to use the 
name of such insured claimant in any transaction or litigation in-
volving such rights or remedies. If the payment does not cover the 
loss of such insured claimant, the Company shall be suDrogated to 
such rignts and remedies in the proDortion wnicn said payment 
bears to the amount of said loss, but such subrogation shail be in 
subordination to the insured mortgage. If loss of onority should 
result from any act of such insured claimant, sucn act snail not 
void this poiicy, but the Company, in that event, shaii be reouired 
to pay only that part of any losses insured against hereunder wnich 
shail exceed the amount, if any, lost to the Company by reason of 
the impairment of the right of subrogation. 
1 1. Liability Limited to this Poiicy 
This instrument together with all endorsements and other instru-
ments, if any, attached hereto by the Company is the entire ooiicy 
and contract between the insured and the Company. 
Any ciaim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negii-
gence. and which arises out of the status of the lien of the insured 
mortgage or of the title to the estate or interest covered hereDv 
or any action asserting such ciaim, shail be restricted to the pro-
visions and conditions and stipulations of this poiicv. 
No amendment of or endorsement to this poiicv can be made 
except by writ ing endorsed hereon or attached hereto signed bv 
either the President, a Vice President, the Secretary, an Assistant 
Secretary, or validating officer or authorized signatory of the 
Company. 
12. Notices, Where Sent 
i ) All naumpnr i ; imnpr *hi<; n m i r v ovranr nowmonrc nnnna f ^ r 
SCHEDULE A 
? of Policy: March 16, 1984 @ 11:15 a.m. GF No. 55397 
)unt of Insurance $ 81,400.00 
lame of Insured: 
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION 
'he estate or interest In the land described in this Schedule and which is encumbered by the insured mortgage is: (a fee, a 
*aseho!d, etc.) 
:EE 
'he estate or interest referred to herein is at Date of Policy vested in: 
L LYNN STRONG AND CHERIE G. STRONG,husband and wife, as joint tenants 
"he mortgage, herein referred to as the insured mortgage, and the assignments thereof, if any, are described as 
ollows: 
Deed of Trust from M. Lynn Strong & Cherie G. Strong, husband and wife, as Trustor, to 
Guardian Title Company, as Trustee, and FCA Mortgage Corporation, a corporation organized 
and existing under the laws of Utah, as Beneficiary, to secure $81,400.00, dated March 9, 
1984, recorded March 14, 1984, in Book 5538, Page 1642, as Entry No. 3915815. 
Assigned to American Savings & Loan Association, by Assignment of Deed of Trust, dated 
March 9, 1984, recorded March 16, 1974, in Book 5539, Page 617, as Entry No. 3917080. 
The land referred to in this policy is described as follows: 
All of Lot 22, MID-VALLEY ESTATES, according to the official plat thereof, Situate in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
The total charge for this policy including risk premium is $363.00. 
PC. JY NO. M 084729 
Case No. 55397 
l is Policy does not insure against loss or damage by reason of the following: 
^ Taxes for the year 1984, now accruing, not yet due and payable. 1983 Ta^es have been 
paid as to Serial No. 32-0416-021. 
. Public Utilities, Drainage and Irrigation Easement over the East 7 feet; the South. 7 
feet; and the Westerly 7 feet; as shown at plat. 
. An Easement in favor of Crus Brothers Construction Company for drainage over, across 
and through the East 7 feet; as contained in that certain Grant of Easement recorded 
February 3, 1977, in Book 4446, Page 392. 
. Said property is located within the boundaries of the Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary 
District No. 2 and is subject to all assessments and service charges levied thereunder. 
Said assessments and service charges are paid and current. 
. Said property is located within the boundaries of the Salt Lake County Special District 
#1 and is subject to all assessments and service charges levied thereunder. 
Said assessments and service charges are paid and current. 
SCHEDULE B —PART II 
ddition to the matters set forth in Part I of this Schedule, the title to the estate or interest in the land described or referred to 
chedule A is subject to the following matters, if any be shown, but the Company insures that such matters are subordinate 
ie lien or charge of the insured mortgage upon said estate or interest: 
NONE 
Endorsement 
M 084729 
(to and forming a part of Policy of Title Insurance No. . . . . ) 
'
 u Case No. 55397 
lssuedbv
 STRONG, M. Lynn 
USLIFE TITLE INSURANCE Company of Dallas (Herein called the company) 
The Company hereby insures against loss which said Insured shall sustain by reason of any of the following 
matters: 
1. Any incorrectness in the assurance which the Company hereby gives: 
(a) That there are no covenants, conditions, or restrictions under which the lien of the mortgage or deed 
of trust referred to in Schedule A can be cut off, subordinated, or otherwise impaired; 
(b) That there are no present violations on said land of any enforceable covenants, conditions, or restrictions; 
(c) That, except as shown in Schedule B, there are no encroachments of buildings, structures, or improvements 
located on said land onto adjoining lands, nor any encroachments onto said land of buildings, structures, 
or improvements located on adjoining lands. 
2. (a) Any future violations on said land of any covenants, conditions, or restrictions occurring prior to acquisition 
of title to said estate or interest by the Insured, provided such violations result in loss or impairment of the lien of 
the mortgage referred to in Schedule A, or result in loss or impairment of the title to said estate or interest if the 
Insured shall acquire such title in satisfaction of the indebtedness secured by such mortgage; 
(b) Unmarketability of the title to said estate or interest by reason of any violations on said land, occurring prior to 
acquisition of title to said estate or interest by the Insured, of any covenants, conditions, or restrictions. 
3. Damage to existing improvements, including lawns, shrubbery or trees: 
(a) Which are located or encroach upon that portion of the land subject to any easement shown in Schedule 
B, which damage results from the exercise of the right to use or maintain sucn easement for the purposes for 
which the same was granted or reserved; 
(b) Resulting from the exercise of any right to use the surface of said land for the extraction or development 
of the minerals excepted from the description of said land or shown as a reservation in Schedule B. 
4. Any final court order or judgment requiring removal from any land adjoining said land of any encroachment 
shown in Schedule B. 
The total liability of the Company under said policy and any endorsements attached thereto shail, however, 
not exceed, in the aggregate, the face amount of said policy and the costs which the Company is obligated 
under the schedules, conditions and stipulations thereof to pay. 
This endorsement is made a part of said policy and is subject to the schedules, conditions and stipulations 
therein, except as modified by the provisions hereof. 
This Endorsement is not to be construed as insuring the title as of any later date than the date of said policy, 
except as herein expressly provided as to the subject matter hereof. 
Signed under seal for the Company, but this Endorsement is to become valid only when it bears an authorized 
countersignature. 
Dated: March 1 f i t IQfld 
fa&</&L 
President & Chief Executive Officer 
/£/L<.JA- i/*e/0&~/~ 
Attest: Vice-President. Secretary and Generai Counsel 
DIAN 
GJJJL 
N T/TRLE COMPANY i^F UTAH 
Arrthorbed Officer or ~Agent. 
Us 
CLTA Form 100 (L'uh-Arz.: 20M 179H 
Endorsement iCC - 1 7 4 - 1 U1i>G57 Gc^CO - 1y5 0 i 5 7 7 
, , , xn , , T , , M M Q84729 
to and forming a part of Policy of Title lnsurance.No
 mi _ . - - _ - , ) 
Case No. 55397 
,ssuedby
 STRONG, M, Lynn 
USLIFE TITLE INSURANCE Company of Dallas (Herein called the company) 
The Company assures the Insured that at the date of said policy there is located on said land 
A single family residence known as: 
7629 South. 835 East 
Midvale, UT 84047 
and that the map attached to this policy shows the correct location and dimensions of the land described 
in Schedule A as described by those records which under the recording laws impart constructive notice as 
to said land 
The Company hereby insures the Insured against loss which said Insured shall sustain in the event the assurances 
herein shall prove to be incorrect 
The total liability of the Company under said policy and any endorsements attached thereto shall however not 
exceed in the aggregate the face amount of said policy and the costs which the Company is obligated under 
the schedules conditions and stipulations thereof to pay 
This endorsement is made a part of said policy and is subject to the schedules conoitions and stipulations 
therein except as modified by the provisions hereof 
Signed under seal for the Company but this Endorsement Ts to become valid only when it bears an authorized 
countersignature 
Dated March l f i , iq«4 
President A Chief Executive Officer 
/&St«/A. Uu/0&J-
Attest Vice-President Secretary and General Counsel 
[WDJ ,RDIAN TLfDuCOMPAN^OF UlfAH 
Officer 
( 
Autnotized fficer or Agent 
l is 
<£&. |M! 
CLTAForm 116 (Utan- Arz.; 15M 1~9H 
EXHIBIT 'A" 
March 1 7 , 1988 
David M. McConkie, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RE: American Savings and Loan Association v. Title USA 
Insurance Corporation et al. 
Dear David: 
Pursuant to our recent discussions, I am tendering the 
enclosed check in the amount of $29,957.30 payable to the joint 
order of American Savings and Loan Association and yourself. As 
discussed, this check is tendered in partial payment of the loss 
described in your client1s complaint and is comprised of (i) the 
principal sum of $27,131.19 (which is the amount due and owing by 
the Strongs to the Scenic Rail Credit Union as of the date of the 
trust deed sale on February 23, 1987) and (ii) interest at the 
rate of ten percent per annum from February 23, 1987 to the date 
of this letter* As we discussed, your client's acceptance of 
this check is without prejudice to its maintenance of claims for 
additional loss under the subject policy. 
Finally, I wish to stress that this tender was 
contemplated by the offer contained in my letter of July 6, 1987 
and was deferred to this point because I was informed only 
recently of your client's desire to accept any such tender. 
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
BIELE, HASLAM &. HATCH 
JOHN T. ANDERSON 
JTA:lb 
Enclosure 
cc: John C. Mulvihill, Esq. (CL-161-87) 
Lynn Mabey, Esq. 
P.S. I will send you the letter outlining settlement of the 
remaining balance of the claim in the next day or two. 
mck.ltr 
Title USA Insurance Corporation 
escnption Amount Description Amount 
161;'7. C 29,9r'7.;;f 
)heck Total <-r}{-\ CIS/ ^' ' Date VO. / f t t Check T-fvn her: 1^0 
Title USA Insurance Corporation 
580 Decker Drive 
Irving, TX 75062 
001330 
88-7415 
a v
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